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Twentieth Century Enterprise Forms: Japan in Comparative Perspective 
 
“the dominant scholarly effort was to try to fit the world into simple models and to criticize 
institutional arrangements that did not fit” 
          Elinor Ostrom, Nobel Lecture, American Economic Review 2010, p.642 
 
 
                                        COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW: THE DISSOLVING CONSENSUS 
 
Corporate laws - and the differential effects of their menus of organizational forms on 
business efficiency - have recently attracted attention. La Porta and researchers connected 
with the World Bank proposed the “law and finance” hypothesis: that common law 
systems (concentrated in the “Anglosphere”)1 promoted stock exchange development, 
optimal business contracting, new business formation and economic efficiency.2 By 
contrast the Franco-German civil law systems of continental Europe - and offshoots 
throughout Latin America and in most of Asia - were less conducive to corporate 
development. Criticising this view, Guinnane et al in this journal argued that civil law 
systems had advantages over US common law,3 particularly for SMEs. Downgrading the 
classic corporation to what they consider its distinctly limited place, they praise innovative 
                                                          
1
 i.e. the US, UK, India, Hong Kong, Australia, Israel and other heirs of British Empire institutions, with 
exceptions such as Louisiana, Quebec, Scotland, Mauritius or Malta, which retained civil law systems. 
2
 La Porta et al, “Law and Finance” and “Economic Consequences;” Djankov et al “Regulation.” 
3 though not the UK whose “private company” law of 1907 they consider similar to civil law hybrid forms, see 
Guinnane et al, “Putting” and “Pouvoir.”  
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European forms, notably the GmbH (introduced in 1892 in Germany and 1906 in Austria) 
and the SARL (introduced in 1925 in France) as offering contractual choices more suited to 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) than conservative and inflexible US corporate law. 
If either (or both)4 of these hypotheses applies to Japan, its economy before 1940 was 
legally backward and organizationally disadvantaged. Meiji reformers were keen to copy 
western models but (after an unhappy flirtation with American-style national banking 
corporations in 1872-9) decided that the clarity of civil law commercial codes was 
preferable to Anglo-American judicial discretion and Meiji autocrats were increasingly 
attracted to the “top-down” approach that they detected in Germany. After some 
discussion of French and English commercial laws - and under pressure to adopt western 
laws to facilitate reassertion of national control in the treaty ports - the definitive Japanese 
commercial code of 1899 clearly owed most to Germany’s Handelsgesetzbuch. The 
characterization of Japanese law as an offshoot of German civil law (at least before 
externally-imposed post-1945 legal Americanisation) is widely accepted. Yet Guinnane et 
al’s alleged advantage of the German system, the GmbH, was rejected in the interim 
Japanese commercial code of 1893 and still omitted from the definitive commercial code 
of 1899.5 It was thus not available to Japanese entrepreneurs for nearly half a century after 
                                                          
4
 arguably the first applies more to large quoted companies and the second to unquoted SMEs. 
5
 The government’s German legal adviser, Roesler, suggested what was effectively a GmbH (a sakin kaisha or 
limited partnership in which all partners were limited) in 1884, before German GmbH legislation. It was 
included in the tentative 1890 commercial code, but omitted from the 1893 implementation (individually 
authorized goshi kaisha then required at least one unlimited partner, conforming to the internationally 
standard commandite form). There was little interest in the GmbH proper: it appears to have first been 
discussed in a Japanese academic article as late as 1907 (Yamazaki, “Doitsu”). 
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its introduction in Germany: the yugen kaisha was introduced as late as 1940 and never 
became as widely used in Japan as the GmbH in Germany.6 
                          Before concluding that Japanese legislators were incompetent, it is worth noting that 
lawyers have been skeptical about the hypotheses,7 which historians and economists have also 
questioned: La Porta et al’s extensively,8 Guinnane et al’s more tentatively.9 Moreover, the Japanese 
code of 1899 was much more than a foolishly truncated copy of German law. We argue here that it 
offered a flexible organizational menu, molded by entrepreneurs to the needs of a developing 
nation’s diverse business organizations. By contrast German corporations - under formally similar 
laws - were handicapped by illiberal statutory and administrative provisions, later amplified by 
authoritarian absurdities. Japan and its colonies allowed more legal elasticity, so their corporate laws 
- despite their German roots - well and flexibly served the needs of capitalists - including the SMEs 
on which Guinnane et al focus - well before the 1940 innovation of the yugen kaisha. Germany’s 
Sonderweg in corporate matters is not representative even of countries which shared its legal 
tradition: as we shall see, many had more liberal regimes than Germany and hence more companies 
per capita, even before they introduced the private company form.                         
                                                          
6
 In 1995, there were 1,219,214 yugen kaisha and 1,213,034 KKs, a pattern very similar to Switzerland’s, whose 
corporate laws Japan’s more closely resembled. By contrast in Germany GmbHs (sometimes in hybrids with 
other forms which were illegal in Japan) were overwhelmingly numerically dominant. 
7
 Cheffins, “Did law;” Coffee, “Rise.” 
8
 Musacchio and Turner, “Does the law.” 
 
9
 Hilt, “Corporate Governance,” p. 233; Hannah, “Global Corporate Census,” p. 553 n.33. 
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                    Various metrics have been proposed to assess the impact of legal menus on levels of 
corporatization.10 Guinnane et al count changing stocks (and flows) of registered private companies 
relative to alternative business forms and we extend their approach in the next section by 
comparing the numerical stocks of all corporations at decade intervals in five countries over the 
whole twentieth century (normalised in per capita terms), finding that Germany is the laggard 
among the advanced countries considered, and soon overtaken by Japan.  An alternative measure is 
paid-up capital of all companies relative to GDP (giving greater weight to large firms), but this is 
correlated with a variant of our numbers measure in 191011 and after 1914 differential inflation and 
deflation make it difficult to compare this measure internationally. We treat private companies as 
corporations proper but they might be considered hybrids, so the next section compares them with 
other quasi-corporate forms. Equity market capitalisations relative to GDP (the variant suggested by 
La Porta et al for assessing the impact of investor protection) are then considered. The following 
section assesses whether Japan’s corporate development typifies a distinctive Asia-Pacific model of 
pyramided holding companies and family enterprise groups. Although the impact of national laws on 
the level of corporatization is the main focus of this essay, our conclusion places these findings in the 
context of related research on the impact of corporatization on growth, on which La Porta et al 
acknowledge their positive findings are least robust and Guinnane et al are agnostic. 
 
                                                                A STATISTICAL FRAMEWORK 
                  Central to our assessment is the notion of revealed preference: if a legal template for 
organising business is widely adopted, we presume it offers something valued by those taking it up 
                                                          
10
 The World Bank’s Doing Business indicators use more eclectic metrics, for which long-run historical data are 
largely lacking. 
11
 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient for the minority of 34 countries for which both measures are 
available is 0.78 (Hannah, “Global Census,” p. 557) 
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(at least) and (possibly) by society at large. However, creditors might reasonably view limited liability 
less favorably than incorporators and Guinnane et al’s tentative agnosticism about whether higher 
take-up of a particular form is efficient or socially beneficial is well taken. It is also conceivable that a 
system of total liberty would be so abused as to undermine faith in the capitalist system, leading to 
fewer corporations, but in fact this did not happen, even in the most liberal regime.12 Flexibility may 
nonetheless bias the type of company being formed. For example, allowing directors to entrench 
their position to the detriment of outside shareholders might encourage incorporation by family 
oligarchs, while discouraging public offerings (though legislation reserved for quoted companies or 
stock exchange listing rules might separately promote the latter). Guinnane et al interestingly 
suggest that flexible internal governance rules drove high take-up of the private company, allowing 
businesses to limit the threat of untimely dissolution inherent in partnerships without taking on the 
full risk of minority oppression facilitated by classic corporations. They also point to other possible 
encouragements offered by legal forms, including cheaper registration costs, the ability to entrench 
senior management or minority veto rights, and lighter regulatory burdens (which in some countries 
were more attractive than in Germany). Other possible attractions - also varying internationally -  
included an administrative process capable of registering a company in hours not weeks, minimal 
publicity, paralegal intermediaries selling “off-the-shelf” companies, regionally-devolved registration 
offices, the absence of minimum required capital, tax privileges, not requiring an expensive notary to 
endorse changes in ownership or charter conditions, minimal annual re-registration requirements 
and (in the extreme) not having secret police and a cowed judiciary endorsing their expropriations. 
Our measure of the take-up of various business forms captures only the net effect of the whole 
                                                          
12
 Norway, where there was almost total freedom of private contracting for enterprise forms until 1910, had 
more corporations per capita than elsewhere in Europe, Hannah, “Global Census,” pp. 550, 558. However, 
compare Foreman-Peck and Hannah (“Diffusion,” pp. 20-21) for Norwegian opinion, possibly for good reason, 
favoring a new statutory template. 
6 
 
package of liberal flexibility (combined with any other determinants); other means (econometric or 
archival) have to be found to distinguish their relative importance.  
                           Comprehensive annual statistics on the numbers and capitals of extant stocks of all 
multi-owner business forms are not available for most countries for the twentieth century as a 
whole. Several series are, however, available annually for Japan from 1883 to the present for all 
forms in the Commercial Code and can be linked to form one continuous series (see appendix). For 
the four other countries in Table 1 we have similarly comprehensive statistics only for fully corporate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Extant Stocks of (Private and Public) Corporations per million people, 1899-1999. 
Year                   USA                       UK                    Germany        Switzerland                Japan      
1899                  1,875                   684                       174                     615                         89            
1909                  2,901                1,044                       341                     961                       117          
1919                  2,778                1,576                       604                 1,827                        302           
1929                  3,895                2,412                       851                 3,177                        331         
1939                  3,584                3,486                       415                 4,547                        452        
1949                  4,121                4,974                       486                 4,761                     2,081       
1959                  6,064                6,825                       725                 6,248                     4,861       
1969                  8,182                9,666                   1,265               10,216                     7,868     
1979                11,358              13,978                   3,706               16,807                   11,634         
1989                 14,605             20,181                   6,513               23,198                   15,527       
1999                 19,778             23,866                 10,846               28,947                   19,384      
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Source: appendix 
 
forms (defined here as Japan’s kabushiki kaisha (KKs)13 plus yugen kaisha, in the UK public plus 
private companies, in the US quoted plus close corporations, in Germany AGs plus GmbHs and in 
Switzerland SAs plus SARLs).14  Partnership forms are excluded: necessarily, since - outside Japan - 
their numbers are rarely reported annually with precision. In order to assess the level of 
corporatization in these nations of vastly different - and differentially changing - sizes, we have 
divided the numbers of corporations by their national populations at all dates.  
                              The most obvious feature of the table is that the common law countries (the US and 
UK) were ahead of both Germany and Japan at the beginning of the twentieth century and remained 
so at the end. If the corporate form (as defined in this table) had advantages, these two common law 
nations apparently benefitted earlier and more abundantly. However, the example of civil law 
Switzerland suggests that legal family was no barrier to rapid catch-up. Swiss corporate law, owing 
something to German stems, was on a federal rather than cantonal basis and (though Swiss lawyers 
debated developments elsewhere) developed independently. The number of corporations per capita 
                                                          
13
 We follow contemporary statistical practice by including kabushiki goshi kaisha /Kommanditgesellschaften 
auf Aktien (KGaAs, or limited partnerships with transferable shares) with KKs/AGs. In the twentieth century 
they were few in either country. 
14
 See Table 2 below. France is not included, because its statistics are better on flows of new registrations than 
on stocks of extant ones shown in the table: stock figures are only available at irregular intervals. They do, 
however, indicate that France resembled Germany in numbers of corporations as defined here (according to 
Bozio’s (“Capitalisation,” p. 110) extrapolations from a 1921 observation, the figures for 1900, 1909, 1919 and 
1929 were (converted to per million terms) 215, 363, 524, and 986), though France probably made more 
extensive use of commandites before the introduction of the SARL private company form in 1925. It then 
moved ahead of Germany (with more than twice the German per capita level of corporatization in the later 
1930s) and remained slightly ahead of Germany at the end of the century (authors’ calculation from SIRENE 
database). 
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in Switzerland (already ahead of Germany from the earliest available statistical counts) overtook the 
UK during World War One and the US in the 1930s; it remained the leader of this group for the rest 
of the century. Moreover, Switzerland was not unique among northwest European countries with 
civil law regimes: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Luxemburg were all (at 
various stages of the twentieth century) nearer to the high Swiss than to the modest German levels 
of corporatization. While common law nations led corporatization at the beginning of the century, 
civil law nations experienced more rapid growth in corporate numbers, so there was some 
convergence. It was quite rare for (non-communist) societies to experience a reduction in the 
numbers of corporations per capita over a sustained period, but some countries managed it. 
Germany appears to hold the record for the longest sustained early decline (which can be more 
precisely dated from 1923 to around 1948), but even the US experienced a temporary check in the 
1930s depression. Factors other than the (unchanging) legal family evidently determined these 
variations. Foreman-Peck and Hannah’s (“Diffusion”) econometric analysis of an international cross-
section before 1914 suggests that more fundamental determinants of corporatization were living 
standards (proxied by GDP per capita) and the degree of liberality and open-ness in economic policy 
(proxied by open-ness to international trade). The latter is closely correlated with more corporation-
friendly legal systems, in both common and civil law nations.  
                         How does Japan fit into this picture? As Table 1 shows, in the early twentieth century it 
had relatively few corporations. Japan was still an early-stage industrialiser but it had also come late 
to allowing incorporation without individual state sanction (as had become the norm in western 
Europe, America and some of the developing world by the 1870s). Nonetheless in the post-war 
miracle years Japan came to have corporate numbers comparable with other leading nations, and at 
century-end it had numbers of corporations per million people almost as high as the US and well 
ahead of Germany. Japan had already overtaken Germany’s corporations per capita in the 1930s 
(when it still had much lower living standards), confirming that adopting a civil law system - even 
one based on the German code but without the GmbH - did not especially inhibit incorporation. 
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                         However, Germany was by then a very soft target. Its declining corporate numbers, 
beginning a decade before Hitler’s 1933 election victory, were further reduced by Nazi policies under 
his dictatorship. These condemned outside shareholders as leeches on managerial creativity, 
reduced shareholder protections, restricted dividends and stock issues, expropriated Jewish 
companies and provided strong incentives for Aryans to convert their corporations to partnership 
form.15 Other right-wing authoritarian regimes - such as Japan and Italy - shared only some anti-
corporate prejudices and did not emulate the more extreme of these policies. Like many 
combatants, the Japanese government (on a full war footing in 1937-45) naturally restricted 
dividends and concentrated existing corporations on armaments production, but its overall numbers 
of corporations consistently increased, with only slight and temporary setbacks.16 
                                                         ALTERNATIVE BUSINESS FORMS 
                                    The statistics for corporations in table 1 arguably understate Japan’s early 
position. Statisticians and lawyers (even within the same legal family) draw the dividing  lines among 
enterprise forms in different places, not always using identical logic or language in doing so and 
sometimes blurring lines of other division nations consider clear. As Elinor Ostrom insists in different 
                                                          
15
 Despite this, the obvious alternative form - Kommanditgesellschaft (KG) - was not as popular in Germany as 
goshi kaisha in Japan at the same time. In 1938 (in the boundaries of the Old Reich, i.e. excluding Austria etc) 
there were 22 KGaAs, 5,493 AGs, 25,625 GmbHs, and 233 Gewerkschaften (a total of 31,373 for all 
corporations), compared with only 13,142 KGs (Wirtschaft und Statistik, no 24, 1939, pp. 771-3), so in 1938 
including KGs would increase the corporate total by 42%, compared with 138 % for the equivalent goshi kaisha 
adjustment in Japan in that year. Numbers in Germany then perhaps most closely approached Japan’s high 
levels): earlier (but less comprehensive) census data suggest a lower portion were KGs in 1907 or 1924. On 
German policy see Burhop et al, “Law” and Hannah, “Weimar’s Capitalist Spring”. 
16
 At the wartime peak of 1943, kaisha numbers were 11% higher than in 1937 and in 1945’s devastated 
economy remained 4% higher (Historical Statistics of Japan, Table 6) 
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contexts, many cooperative, multi-agent contractual relations may function in a coherent manner, 
without conforming to a market/hierarchy/state trichotomy.17 Table 2 illustrates some of the issues 
in multi-owner organizations, though forms masquerading as linguistic equivalents in the  
Table 2. Capitalist Enterprise Forms in the First Half of the Twentieth Century. 
UK              public            private         limited       ordinary                   special                              sole  
                 company      company       partner-       partner-               associations*                     proprietor 
                                                                    ship           ship                                     
 US                      corporation                  limited     general                     *                                          sole 
                                                          partnership  partnership                                                       proprietor 
Japan           kabushiki      yugen             goshi           gomei            special                           kojin jigyō  
                      kaisha          kaisha†          kaisha           kaisha            kumiai                               sha  
 
                                                                                                                                      
Germany    AG                  GmbH               KG              OHG                    *                               Allein- 
                                                             (Kommandit)                                                                  inhaber 
                                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                                                     
France         SA                 SARL                 SC                 SNC                    *                        propriétaire 
                                                             (commandite)                                                              unique 
                          
 
*In addition to kaisha, there were many kumiai (cooperatives or associations) in Japan besides those 
set up under special legislation from 1900 (the “special” kumiai in col 5. Many similar entities existed 
in western countries, sometimes set up as cooperatives, sometimes as corporations, but also with a 
wide variety of names, liability regimes, profit distribution rules and legal status (savings banks, 
credit unions, mutuals, Vereine, Raffeisen, etc). 
† from 1940. The godo kaisha, introduced in 2006 to succeed the yugen kaisha, is irrelevant for this 
historical discussion. 
 
 
                                                          
17
 See her Nobel lecture, opening quotation above.  
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organizational menus of this table conceal considerable variations (anyone who has ordered 
spaghetti bolognese in Bologna, Los Angeles and Tokyo will understand the problem of menus).18 
Corporations - the first two columns - encompass two types (though their legal separation in many 
countries only came in the second half of the twentieth century): public companies, which could be 
(but were not necessarily) quoted; and private companies, not offering stock to the public. Some 
countries exempted private companies from requirements to publish accounts and restricted their 
shareholder numbers (for example, Japan and the UK, but not Germany, imposed maximum 
numbers of fifty). By this period stockholders normally (but not invariably) had limited liability, while 
partners in ordinary partnerships (col 4) did not. Limited partnerships (col. 3) occasionally had fully 
limited liability but usually (as in Japan) followed the old European model of the commandite: 
managing partners retained full liability and only outside investors had limited liability. This table 
includes only capitalist enterprises: state and municipal businesses (unless they were organised 
under the general law for capitalist enterprises) are excluded, as are some older legal forms once 
common in Europe but approaching extinction19 and minor variants that contemporaries treated 
together with the cases shown.20  The order of the six forms shown in the table can be thought of as 
a ranking: it is broadly true that progressing from public companies to sole proprietors entails a 
movement toward smaller enterprises, usually with fewer owners and greater personal liability. Yet 
                                                          
18
 We do not show Switzerland separately since French and German terminology was used there and (though 
its laws substantially differed) no new legal principles are illustrated by the Swiss case. 
19
 The bergrechtliche Gewerkschaft in Germany or the similar “cost-book” mining company in the UK were 
species of cooperative with distinctly capitalist characteristics and in many cases quoted on stock exchanges, 
so closer to the corporate form than most cooperatives. Japan did not have similar forms. 
20
 For example, the kabushiki goshi kaisha was a limited partnership with shares, a cross between a KK (it 
issued shares) and a goshi kaisha (managing partners had unlimited liability).  
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giant enterprises have at times existed in all categories and it is possible for a corporation (de jure or 
de facto)21 to be owned by one person, uniting the extremes.  
                        Cooperatives and mutuals are generally excluded, since, though they made and 
distributed profits, control rights were generally not proportional to the capital subscribed or 
dividends paid (by then the capitalist norm); instead each member normally had one vote.  However, 
in Japan some kinds of kumiai – variously translated as cooperatives, associations or partnerships - 
were close counterparts to certain collective business firms in the west.22 Kumiai was the term used 
in the civil code to describe partnerships which had neither separate legal personality nor limited 
liability.23 Many were very similar to western (unlimited) business partnerships, and they had 
similarly wide freedom to contract and modify contracts when circumstances changed, but 
responsibility for debts was not (as in the west) joint and several, but proportional to participations 
in the enterprise (or, if creditors had not been apprised of that, equal liability per partner).24 Other                  
                                                          
21
 Some jurisdictions recognised “corporations sole,” but multi-ownership was usually a necessary condition 
for incorporation, though such rules were often (and with varying degrees of legal risk) evaded by the 
appointment of dummy shareholders. 
22
 Since no statistics are available for any country, we do not consider tokumei kumiai (literally “anonymous 
associations”), the Japanese equivalent of Germany’s stille Gesellschaften or France’s associations en 
participation. These were loans made by “sleeping” investors on the basis of participating in the borrower’s 
profits, usually incurring no liability for this participation in civil law jurisdictions (or in the UK from 1865), but 
with a (significant but declining) risk of judicial attribution of partnership liability in the US.  
23
 It was also used to describe labour unions (rōdō kumiai) and some social, cultural and professional 
associations as well as some commercial cooperatives and partnerships. 
24
 This was under the earlier Japanese civil code (not, as with kaisha, the Commercial Code), see de Becker, 
Annotated Civil Code, pp.240-50. They also differed in sometimes being conducted by a default rule of majority 
voting of partners and in permitting one partner to be expelled by unanimity of the other partners. On related 
Chinese traditional views on partnership, see p. 00, below. 
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kumiai (in the fifth column of table 2) set up under special legislation in Japan from 1900 (partly 
modelled, like its corporate law, on German precedent) did have separate legal status; some had 
limited and some unlimited liability.25 Some undertook functions (trade associations, cartels, joint 
purchasing or credit for farmers or homeowners) which might in the west have been constituted 
under special legislation, but were sometimes organised as corporations or cooperatives.26 
                      In Japan’s distinctive terminology, “kaisha” describes all the first four columns in table 2 
(under the Commercial Code) but none of the remainder (under special legislation or the Civil Code). 
This was not the case for similar words for generic types in western languages. The corporate form 
was usually confined to the first two columns (public and private companies) in the Anglosphere, 
while Gesellschaft, société, aktiebolag etc in continental European languages (and “company” in 
Victorian British English and modern American English) cover the first four columns but additionally 
include further types. “Firm” (or even “company”) in English can sometimes include sole proprietors, 
as do non-legal terms like kigyō, “enterprise” or “business” in most languages. Kaisha is usually 
translated as “company” (in its more restricted modern sense) or “corporation,” but is that correct? 
Not to twentieth century Anglo-American lawyers. Common law partnerships did not then have 
                                                          
25
 For sangyo kumiai under the Industrial Association Law of 1900 see n.41, below. On this enterprise form, see 
Fisher, “Cooperative Movement,” Churchill, “Cooperatives.” There were also dogyo kumiai (trade associations 
mainly for assuring quality under another 1900 law), suisan kumiai (fishery associations under a 1901 law) and 
shinrin kumiai (forestry associations under a 1907 law). In 1925 further laws created associations to cartelise 
exports (kogyo kumiai for manufacturers and yushutshu kumiai for merchants), with stronger controls over 
non-members than dogyo kumiai. Limited liability in the 1930s was discouraged as insufficiently prudent, with 
cooperatives increasingly adopting “guaranteed” capital, increasing (but still limiting) the liabilities of sangyo 
kumiai and their members (for the shift see e.g. Fisher, “Cooperative Movement,” p. 483 and the statistics in 
Financial and Economic Annual of Japan, 1930-38.) 
26
 e.g. Raffeisen cooperatives in Germany, corporate savings banks in the US, building societies in the UK. 
14 
 
separate legal personality in the US and England,27 but in Japan some types - partnerships (ordinary 
or limited) under the commercial code (both kaisha) and some (but not all) kumiai - did and even in 
civil law Scotland, France and Germany partnerships had some characteristics of separate legal 
entity.28  
                    Guinnane et al (2007) describe the GmbH as a “hybrid” and there was initial 
contemporary uncertainty about how to describe it. Some – noting the GmbH’s corporate form and 
fully limited liability – translated it as private limited company (close corporation); others – noting 
that its ownership stakes were named Anleihen (quotas) rather than Aktien (stocks) and that, as with 
partnership stakes, they were not tradable on stock exchanges – translated it as limited partnership. 
The first usage predominated, but the latter has recently been revived in American English, where, 
from the 1970s, newly legally-defined “limited liability companies” (private companies) - though 
sharing most legal characteristics of corporations - are technically considered partnerships. The 
historically pervasive Anglo-American use of that same term as a synonym of corporation is 
accordingly falling into disuse by the minority of English speakers in the US.29 Confusingly, “limited 
                                                          
27
 though in practice common law courts struggled to maintain this view (Crane, Handbook, 8-16). In the US 
the revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1997 finally conferred separate legal personality on all partnerships, 
but implementation by states differed. In England and Wales from 2000 limited liability partnerships (but not 
general or limited partnerships) had separate legal personality, like companies, though continued to be taxed 
as partnerships. The world is thus now nearer the Japanese usage than it was historically and the distinctive 
meaning of corporation in English has become fuzzier. 
28
 There were, for example, different rules about whether creditors suing to recover debts had to exhaust all 
partnership assets before proceeding against one or more partner’s individual assets. 
29
 Although there were numerous close (private) companies organised under general corporation laws in 
earlier decades, the formal US legal equivalents of the British private company – “limited liability companies” - 
were only introduced by Wyoming as late as 1977 and were numerous nationwide in the US only from the 
15 
 
liability companies” in British English (in this context more widely spoken worldwide)30 are definitely 
not partnerships, but corporations proper. 
                               Economists might wish to define the boundaries between enterprises differently 
from lawyers and the legal categories in Table 2 – even if not coinciding exactly with their needs - 
will sometimes provide serviceable approximations. For example, to measure enterprises that were 
corporate (in the Anglosphere’s sense) and in which everyone, including the top managers, had 
limited liability, one combines the types in the first two columns, making small adjustments.31 To 
include registered enterprises in which outside investors – but not designated principals or 
managing partners - had limited liability one needs to add limited partnerships and some cases from 
col. 5. To include all capitalist multi-owner entities one further adds unlimited partnerships and 
more cases from col. 5, again correcting for odd exceptions.32 Practicalities are more difficult than 
principles. Ordinary partnership data are full for Japan (at least for Commercial Code kaisha, though 
not for Civil Code kumiai) but often only partial or non-existent for other countries. Such gaps in the 
statistical record leave some inevitable lacunae in comparative measures. 
                       Japan has fuller data for its kaisha (the first four columns) than the equivalents in most 
countries, facilitating examination of some variations resulting from alternative definitions. In Table 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1990s. Many American books published before this recent divergence of legal definition from common usage 
still treated “(limited liability) company” and “corporation” as synonyms, as in modern British English. 
30
 English-speakers in Australasia, India, Singapore, Hong Kong etc, as in the UK, still generally treat private 
limited liability companies as corporations proper, like other joint stock companies. 
31
 In many jurisdictions by 1900 limited liability was a necessary feature of incorporation, but that was not true 
before 1850 (when limited liability was less commonly specified in corporate charters). There were still 
exceptions: some UK registered companies had unlimited liability and all California corporations until 1933 had 
only proportional liability. The table omits western cooperatives and mutuals and some of these (and some 
Japanese kumiai in the table) had limited liability. 
32
 As we have noted, a few of these had de jure single owners and more de facto single owners. 
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1, following a common convention, we counted as corporations only the first two columns. For 
Japan - before 1940 - this includes only the first column, the KK, though one might view this with 
equanimity. Japan as yet had no formal private company form, but many KKs - as with the basic 
corporation in other countries - were de facto private,33 in the sense that they had few shareholders 
and their shares were not traded publicly, so companies in some respects resembling the German 
GmbH are actually included. Moreover, the differentiation is logically uniform: both limited and 
unlimited partnerships are also excluded from all countries’ totals. Thus, as a measure of fully limited 
kaisha entities, the totals in Table 1 serve reasonably well for international comparisons.34  
                 Yet there are indications that Japanese limited or ordinary partnerships (in addition to 
being distinctively described as kaisha or “corporate” in Japan’s idiosyncratic legal terminology) and 
also some kumiai, were prone to fulfil functions sometimes undertaken by corporations proper in 
other countries, despite many of them having (partially or fully) unlimited liability. Table 3 puts some 
Table 3. Main Japanese Multi-Owner Enterprise Forms in 1910. 
                                                             Numbers (by liability status)                                       Paid-up capital  
                                                              Limited     Partly   Unlimited     Total                      ¥ million          % of 
                                                                              Limited                            %                                            known 
Public company (KK)                        5,026                0                0            26                          1,244.5             84                  
Limited partnership (goshi kaisha)        0        4,783                0            24                               96.2               6    
Ordinary partnership (gomei kaisha)    0                0         2,499           13                             140.7               9 
Special kumiai*                                 4,204           166         2,889           37                                5.2†               0 
Total (of known)                                9,230        4,949        5,388          100                        1,486.6            100 
                                                          
33
 The terms kabushiki hikōkai kaisha and kabushiki kōbo kaisha exist in Japanese only as translations of 
foreign terms (public and private/close companies/corporations in the Anglosphere) 
34
 The exceptions in note 36 apart, with the additions of some older forms such as bergrechtliche 
Gewerkschaften (see note 19). 
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Source: Department of Finance, Twelfth Financial and Economic Annual of Japan 1912, pp. 83, 86. 
* Sangyo kumiai under the 1900 Industrial Association Law (see Sangyo kumiai yoran), which had a 
choice of liability status: limited (yugen kumiai) and unlimited (mugen kumiai) are self-explanatory; 
the “partly limited” in the table (hosho sekinin) had chosen something in between e.g. double 
liability). In addition to the 7,259 shown in the table there were 49 whose liability was not classified. 
Many of these kumiai were closer to western rural coops than to companies, but shigaichi shinyo 
kumiai (city credit associations, which took deposits from non-members and were able to discount 
bills) and shigaichi kobai kumiai (city consumer cooperatives) were 3,421 fishermen’s associations 
(suisan kumiai) in 1910, but their numbers then rapidly declined also formed under this law. Other 
kumiai seem to have been less numerous: for example, there were; and 916 juyo bussan dogyo 
kumiai (trade associations) in 1912 (the earliest year), numbers that had slightly declined by 1930. 
† Paid-up capital data refer to 3,527 kumiai:  less than half the total numbers. 
 
numbers on the issue for 1910. It is clear that counting KKs alone only just captures most entities 
with fully limited liability in 1910, and captures less than half of those with any limitation of liability 
or with separate legal personhood. It is the cooperatives (mainly special agricultural kumiai) which 
make up most of the numerical deficit in 1910 and that would increase if we had statistics on other 
kumiai. Moreover, even omitting kumiai (as other countries’ statistics omit cooperatives, which they 
appear to have used less intensively than Japan),35 kaisha partnerships (combining goshi and gomei, 
i.e. those with and without some limited partners) also outnumber KKs. However, corporations (KKs) 
are on average much larger, so they account for 85% of paid-up kaisha capital in 1910. Neither 
would their dominance be much diminished if we added the paid-up capital of special kumiai, whose 
numbers grew more slowly and were smaller than kaisha and many of which lost their limited 
liability status in the 1930s.36 Goshi kaisha proliferated at twice the rate of KKs in the quarter century 
                                                          
35
 If Woytinsky’s (Welt, p. 161) estimate of 130-140,000 cooperatives worldwide around 1920 is correct, 
though it is clear there are some lacunae in his figures (idem, pp. 156-171). 
36
 The Financial and Economic Annual of Japan began publishing statistics on their capital only in 1928, 
reporting statistics back to 1917, suggesting similar small sizes to those indicated by the partial data in 
Japanese sources for 1910. The special kumiai numbers had increased to 15,028 by 1935, though the average 
capital of the 92% reporting had grown to ¥18,753 and by 1939 only 726 had fully limited status, many having 
18 
 
after 1910 (their numbers peaked in 1936), with gomei kaisha numbers also growing faster than KKs, 
but both kinds of partnership kaisha remained mainly smaller firms,37 while the average paid-up 
capital of KKs more than doubled. Thus the KK share in all kaisha paid-up capital remained at 85% in 
1935, as in 1910.38  
                     This numerical expansion and stable capital share of partnerships differs from 
continental European experience in this period, where the commandite was in relative decline in 
both numbers and paid-up capital, particularly - as in the cases Guinnane et al emphasize - in 
countries which adopted the GmbH/SARL (private company) form.39 Shimizu argues that limited 
partnerships (goshi kaisha) and private companies (yugen kaisha) were more similar in Japan than 
their European equivalents.40 Goshi kaisha had separate legal personality, like a corporation, and 
might more readily survive the departure of a partner. However even in Japan dissatisfied partners 
in a gomei kaisha could still compel premature dissolution through withdrawal (at the end of a 
business year and with six months’ notice), though limited partners (or their heirs) in a goshi kaisha 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
been pressured to increase their capital and guarantors (Financial and Economic Annual of Japan 1940, pp. 
114-5). 
37
 though there were notable exceptions. The peak Mitsubishi and Sumitomo holding companies remained 
goshi kaisha until 1937 and Mitsui family control was exercised by a peak gomei kaisha until 1940, though 
many of their subsidiary and associated companies were KKs (Japanese judges did not share the US distaste for 
hybrids, such as partnerships owning corporations). The changes were motivated by new double taxation of 
family partnership holdings, which KK holding companies avoided.  
38
 Financial and Economic Annual of Japan 1940, p. 217. 
39
 By 1925, Germany, Austria, the UK, Poland, France (and some countries in their empires) had adopted the 
private company form. 
40
 Shimizu, “Management,” pp. 11-13. 
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could only withdraw if all general partners agreed,41 while withdrawal (as opposed to share sale) was 
forbidden in yugen kaisha, providing fuller entity shielding. Goshi kaisha also differed from KKs or 
yugen kaisha in that at least one partner had to have unlimited liability (and, in respect of debts 
incurred while he was a partner, that liability subsisted for two years after withdrawal), but in 
practice, until a change in the law in 1938 which made it easier to enforce judgments on unlimited 
partners, the procedure for outside creditors to attach assets for partnership debts was onerous. 
Goshi kaisha had other advantages for small, family enterprises. They were cheaper to register than 
KKs,42 did not have to appoint auditors or publish accounts (secrecy was prized by family companies, 
as well as by group holding companies43), required only two rather than seven members and had no 
minimum capital requirement.44 Partnership agreements could also entrench family control, protect 
minorities (through withdrawal rights of unlimited partners for reasonable cause) and allocate rights 
and duties more flexibly than shareholders (who in KKs had to have equal votes per share, with only 
a 50% majority required for major changes).  
                                                          
41
 Vogt and Heath, Commercial Code, pp. 22-7, 36-8. Partnerships were automatically dissolved if all general or 
all limited partners withdrew, but it was easy to convert to gomei status if the latter occurred, and from 1911 
it was possible also to convert from gomei to goshi, attracting limited partners to replace unlimited partner 
withdrawals.  
42
 In 1912 0.4% of capital for gomei or goshi kaisha against 0.5% for KKs (Tanaka, Genko, p. 37); though by 
1936 the standard fee was 0.5% for all kaisha with a minimum of ¥20 (Mizoguchi, Toki, pp. 378, 400, 407). 
43
 See Kaisha Tōkeihyo. In 1927 500 kaisha were holding companies, most of them gomei (214) or goshi (157) 
kaisha, not KKs, and the partnership holdings had larger capitals than KK holdings. In other countries, large 
holding companies were usually corporations, not partnerships (which in some jurisdictions were not allowed 
to control corporations).  
44
 though even in KKs the minimum capital requirement (¥140 authorized or ¥87.5 paid-up), as in Switzerland, 
but unlike Germany, was trivial. 
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                   Goshi kaisha were the smallest of registered kaisha in Japan, with less than a tenth the 
average capital of KKs in 1910 (less than a twentieth by 1935) and only around one-third the average 
capital of ordinary partnerships at both dates. They thus occupied a position in the size hierarchy 
different from the ostensibly similar commandite limited partnerships in the west, which recruited 
limited partners to amass greater resources than unlimited partnerships. We do not have 
comparable capital measures for all German enterprises (only for AGs and GmbHs) but, in 
employment terms, German KGs (limited partnerships) were about eight times the size of OHGs 
(unlimited partnerships) and somewhat larger than GmbHs (private companies).45 In the US, also, 
limited partnerships were of intermediate size.46 Japanese KKs, like AGs in Germany or corporations 
in the US, occupied the top of the firm size hierarchy, but unlimited partnerships (gomei kaisha) - 
oppositely to the norm in western countries47 - were larger than limited ones (goshi kaisha). It was 
the latter - with outside investors’ liability limited and freedom from accounts publication – that 
fulfilled a role similar to GmbHs in Germany. That explains both why goshi kaisha substantially 
                                                          
45
 In the 1907 German census, AG establishments on average had 179 employees (underestimating relative AG 
size since AGs were most likely to have multiple establishments), KGs 79, GmbHs 49 and OHGs (ordinary 
partnerships) only 7.  
46
 In the US manufacturing census of 1909, corporations employed an average of 76 blue-collar workers and all 
partnerships an average of 12. Sizes for the two kinds of partnerships are not separately reported but for 
earlier evidence that, as in Germany, they were larger than ordinary partnerships see Hilt and O’Banion, 
“Limited Partnership.” There were 43 times as many manufacturing establishments in US corporations and 
ordinary partnerships combined than in limited partnerships in 1909; the comparable figure for German 
manufacturing in 1907 was 59 times. Yet, for all industries in Japan in 1907 the comparable multiple was less 
than 1.7 times. Thus limited partnerships were already - in relative terms - massively more important in Japan 
before 1914 (and became more so by the 1930s). 
47
 perhaps because many unlimited partnerships in Japan were organised not as gomei kaisha under the 
commercial code, but under the civil code as kumiai, so reported numbers are biased to large holding 
partnerships and omit some small partnerships, similar to those counted in the US and German statistics. 
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declined (in numbers and share of kaisha capital)48 with the introduction of the yugen kaisha 
(formally the GmbH equivalent)49 in 1940 and also why Shimizu reports that the advantages of the 
GmbH identified by Guinnane et al were not a primary reason for the subsequent rising popularity of 
the yugen kaisha in Japan.50 In the 1920s the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry lobbied for 
a GmbH for small companies, but were successful only when a tightening up of newspaper publicity 
requirements and other rules for KKs seemed unreasonably onerous for small firms. Yugen kaisha 
were introduced in 1940 and were initially nearer in size to KKs than goshi kaisha,51 but smaller firms 
later predominated and, just as Guinnane et al show for Germany and France, the use of limited 
partnerships declined.52 One advantage of the yugen kaisha was extending limited liability to the top 
                                                          
48
 By March 1949 both forms of partnership kaisha were down to 24,451 (17% of corporations proper) and by 
2009 there were only 6,056 left (only 0.5% of the number of corporations). 
49
 It is oversimplifying to describe the yugen kaisha as a copy of the German GmbH. There was no restriction 
on the numbers of holders in a German GmbH (and a few had more than a thousand owners), but the yugen 
kaisha (following the British 1907 legislation) was limited to a maximum of 50 shareholders. On the other 
hand, the British private company had no minimum capital size, while the yugen kaisha had a minimum of 
¥10,000 capital ($2,344 at 1940 controlled exchange rates, higher than most US limits but a lower minimum 
than Germany’s M20,000 ($7,994), though arguably about the same in terms of financial affordability to the 
local bourgeoisie). This minimum was raised to ¥100,000 in 1951 (though, post-inflation, that represented a 
substantial reduction in real terms) and to ¥3 million in 1990 (when a minimum capital requirement was also 
first introduced for KKs at ¥10 million, see Nicholas, “Organization”). 
50
 Shimizu, “Organizations” and “Management.” 
 
51
 In 1940 the average capital of 2,091 yugen kaisha was ¥31,781 and of 35,497 KKs ¥69,123 (and 6,981 KKs 
with capital less than ¥50,000 had an average of ¥20,290). 
52
 See n. 5, above. The requirement of yugen kaisha for a supermajority of 75% with at least 50% of voting 
rights represented for changes on important matters (compared with only a 50% majority for KKs) and the 
possibility of shares with multiple votes (banned in KKs) also created a wider range of choices in such private 
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owner-managers, at least one of whom had to accept liability in a goshi kaisha.53 However, other 
advantages of the GmbH - notably the freedom from compulsory accounts publication and flexibility 
in governance arrangements - were already widely adopted by Japanese SME entrepreneurs in the 
goshi kaisha. It is nonetheless possible that partnerships in Japan were less effective than KKs. 
Nicholas shows that their returns on equity were lower than KKs in 1922-38,54 an observation 
compatible with a dual economy interpretation of enterprise forms. SMEs - often using the 
partnership forms - perhaps occupied the less profitable niches in a developing economy with many 
backward sectors, though all kaisha forms were present in most industries.55 
                              Thus the limited partnership (goshi kaisha) was more popular in its heyday in 1930s 
Japan than its German equivalent (the KG), despite Nazi policy favoring the conversion of AGs and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
companies for minority protection or qualified majority dominance, but this choice was more constrained than 
in Germany or the UK. 
53
 The government specified a minimum capital of ¥10,000, fearing individuals would use the yugen kaisha to 
obtain limited liability (in a goshi kaisha at least one partner had unlimited liability and there was no minimum 
capital requirement). For Shimizu (“Management”) the dominant motivation was the fuller management 
integration needs of mergers of multiple sole proprietors required by government wartime concentration 
policy, while retaining shareholder participation. He also mentions safe within-family ownership dispersion, 
and national and local government and business association endorsement of the form, as factors encouraging 
diffusion of the yugen kaisha.  
54 Nicholas, “Organization.” His finding is particularly surprising because, in countries like the US and UK, 
partnerships (and sole proprietors) have higher measured rates of return on capital than corporations, an 
observation usually explained by partnership profits including some returns to managerial labour, whereas 
corporate profits largely exclude such returns. 
55
 Even in manufacturing, partnerships outnumbered KKs, though partnerships were rare among public 
utilities, insurance and transport kaisha. Goshi kaisha were prominent in mining, where they were the same 
average size as KKs (though less numerous) and were particularly numerous in domestic trade.  
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GmbHs to KGs.56 To find proportions of extant registrations in the limited partnership form as high as 
in 1930s Japan in Germany (or other civil law countries), one has to go back to the early nineteenth 
century, that is to before general registration laws made individual authorization of corporations 
unnecessary,57 or to countries like Russia, where the Tsar’s authorization was still required at the 
time of the 1917 revolution.58 There was, however, nothing uniquely Japanese in flexible responses 
to the absence of the specific GmbH corporate form which Guinnane et al praise. Although 
commandite partnerships were not used in twentieth century Europe as widely as the Japanese 
goshi kaisha,59 KK-equivalents (the AG in Switzerland, the NV in the Netherlands, the AS or AB in 
Scandinavia) were more commonly used to achieve what was offered by GmbHs in Germany and 
goshi kaisha in Japan. This was possible because their laws for this corporate option were less 
stringent - on matters like publicity of accounts and governance rules - than Germany’s for AGs. The 
Netherlands most closely resembled Japan, though - significantly - only after its NV law was 
tightened up in 1928, without permitting the besloten vennootschap (BV, equivalent to a GmbH) 
until 1971. In the intervening decades there was, though less markedly than in Japan, extensive 
recourse to the commandite form. This was unnecessary in Switzerland and many other small 
European countries, because their basic corporate form continued to have less stringent 
requirements, so that form could still be widely used by SMEs and family firms. Similar recourse to 
the KK form was known in Japan (in fact most KKs were small family firms)60 but was less favored 
                                                          
56
 Fränkel, GmbH, p. 36; Statistisches Reichsamt, GmbH, p. 4.   
57
 Hannah, “Corporations.” 
58
 Owen, Corporation,11n; Bokhanov, Krupnaia, 95 n 13; Papp (Development, p. 403. 
 
59
 Anon, “Statistique;” Viandier et al, Société, 66-8, 85-8, 307-27. 
60
 In 1927, 85% of KKs had less than ¥1m ($0.5m) capital and 23% had less than ¥50,000 (Historical Statistics of 
Japan, vol. 4, 1988, 172-3), though some very small KKs continued to be traded on the TSE. By 1957 95% of 
kaisha (which were then overwhelmingly corporations in the sense of table 1, not partnerships) had less than 
¥5m (by then less than $13,889) capital (Historical Statistics of Japan, 2006, vol 2, p. 52). 
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there. This was because Japan’s fuller disclosure requirements, the wider scope of decisions that 
required ratification at a general meeting and shareholder fears of calls on unpaid capital by 
directors at an inconvenient time (which had largely died out in Europe in the nineteenth century) 
discouraged some SMEs from registering as KKs.61 However, the numbers of corporations (KKs) in 
Japan overtook the number of AGs in Germany in 1912 and then expanded even more rapidly. Even 
after the yugen kaisha was introduced in 1940, KKs remained massively more numerous than 
German AGs. The KK was perceived to have more prestige than the yugen kaisha and the provisions 
for protecting shareholder interests in KKs long remained less stringent than those in German AGs. 
The KK also allowed some choices, such as restrictions on share transfers by family owners, which 
were not possible in a German AG, but were allowed in GmbHs.62  
  
                                                                     STOCK EXCHANGES 
                   As the KK form was widely used by family SMEs, we cannot assume that most KK capital 
was publicly traded on stock exchanges, as was the case for AGs in Germany.63  In Japan - as in the 
US, UK and Switzerland64 - de facto close corporations (with shares rarely (if at all) traded and held 
by relatively few people) dominated the corporate population numerically throughout the twentieth 
century.65 Japan did not regulate KKs as stringently as Germany’s 1884 code regulated AGs, nor did it 
emulate the tough additional German stock exchange regulation of 1896/7 which affected quoted 
                                                          
61
 Baum and Takahashi, “Commercial and Corporate Law,” 376; Nanjo and Kasuya, “Unpaid Capital.”  
62
 von Mehren ed., Law, 539. 
63
 Around a third of Prussian AGs (mainly the largest ones) were quoted on a formal exchange (Statistisches 
Jahrbuch 1911, pp. 228,231). 
64
 Before 1938, when the Swiss introduced the GmbH.  
65
 Rajan and Zingales count 389 Japanese companies quoted on Tokyo, Osaka and some other exchanges in 
1913, less than 6% of the 6,562 extant KKs.  
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AGs.66  Such laws reinforced the gatekeeper position of German banks and required AG accounts, 
prospectuses and other investor aids facilitating the divorce of ownership from control.67 With fewer 
such legal protections for investors, one might expect Japanese stock exchange development to lag 
Germany’s, at least until post-war Americanisation promoted investor protection. This increased 
Japan’s score on the “anti-director” rights index (which some modern analysts consider the major 
driver of stock exchange development) from 1 to 5 (out of a possible score of 6).  
 
 
 
Table 4. Stock Markets: Germany and Japan 1913-1999. 
Date                   Ratio of Equity Capitalisation to GDP (%).   Listed Companies per Million Population 
                                    Japan                   Germany                               Japan            Germany 
1913                            49                              44                                        8                        28 
1929                          120                              35                                      17                        20  
1938                          181                              18                                      19                        11 
1950*                            5                               15                                       9                         13 
1970                            23                               16                                     15                          9 
1999                            95                               67                                    20                         13 
                  Source: Rajan and Zingales, “Great Reversals,” pp. 15, 17. 
* Japan’s stock exchanges were closed from 1945 to 1949 and recovery was slower than in Germany.   
 
 
 
                                                          
66
 though KKs did, for example, have to publish accounts, respond to investor concerns in annual general 
meetings, and give shares equal votes. 
67
 Burhop and Lehmann-Hasemeyer, “Geography”; Fohlin, Finance Capitalism; Burhop, Chambers and Cheffins, 
“Law” 
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                      Yet, as Table 4 reports, Japanese equity markets were not behind Germany’s before 
World War One, by Rajan and Zingales’s68  widely-used metric of the ratio of quoted equity 
capitalisation to GDP, and they forged ahead of Germany’s in the interwar years in quoted company 
numbers also. One of the reasons may have been competition both among exchanges and from off-
exchange trading, whereas Berlin (and Frankfurt) gradually dominated Germany’s provincial 
exchanges and off-exchange securities trading was illegal. Unlike major exchanges abroad Japanese 
exchanges encouraged trading by not charging listing fees. Japan’s 46 exchanges of 1898 fell to 13 by 
191169 and to 11 by 1943, when they were compulsorily amalgamated into the Japan Exchange (with 
a main exchange in Tokyo and 10 branch exchanges, of which two soon closed). Outside these 
exchanges, over-the-counter (OTC) unregulated trading of both listed and unlisted stock long 
remained strong (but is excluded from the table), so the precise size of the market is difficult to 
define, but when nine exchanges reopened in 1949, they abolished forward trading in return for a 
ban on this OTC trading of listed stocks.70  (Low) listing fees were introduced and by 1950 much of 
the post-war reorganization of stock corporations was complete. Paradoxically Japan’s quoted 
                                                          
68
 “Great reversals.” Their data include all (Germany) or several (Japan) stock exchanges, not just the major 
metropolitan exchange. Although some of Rajan and Zingales’s statistics have (correctly) been criticised, those 
for Japan and Germany appear broadly correct. Burhop and Lehmann suggest only a slight downward 
adjustment to Rajan and Zingales’s 1913 figure, apparently adopting a stricter definition of domestic firms than 
RZ. Hamao et al (pp.53, 62) show a very similar pattern (though, of course, somewhat lower levels) for the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange alone in 1885-2000 and their estimate of the number of Tokyo- and Osaka--listed 
companies (available only to 1937, pp.60, 65) are compatible with Rajan and Zingales’s figures. The Japanese 
lead will be understated because, while off-exchange trading was prohibited in Germany, there was a 
significant OTC market in addition to the formal exchanges in Japan, in the first half of the century.  
69
 Tamaki, Japanese banking, p.108. 
 
70
 Before 1949, only forward trades had to be on exchanges in Japan: spot trades could be conducted 
anywhere and so the exchanges’ share of this market was low. US-style margin trading was introduced in 1951 
to stimulate demand. 
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capital/GDP ratio reached a nadir at this time when post-war Americanization increased statutory 
investor protection, though within a few decades Japan restored its lead over Germany and now has 
one of the most widely dispersed stockholdings in the world.71 As elsewhere, Japanese corporate 
size distributions were highly skewed and it seems likely that most Japanese KK capital at an early 
stage was in the small minority of companies that were quoted on exchanges,72 as was the norm in 
Europe, rather than (as in the US before 1914 or the global norm today) most corporate capital 
being in close (unquoted) corporations.73  
                       Apart from a tightening of the Commercial Code in 1911, which strengthened directors’ 
liabilities for negligence,74 it is difficult to see any early German-style positive impact of corporate 
law in protecting shareholders in Japan. It has been argued that both law and Nazi politics shifted 
Germany from its strong initial (pre-1914) shareholder value culture to one which stunted stock 
exchange growth (as shown in this table).75 Why did Japan – with an apparently similar Commercial 
                                                          
71
 Faccio and Lang, “Ultimate.” 
72
 In 1900 authorized capital listed on Tokyo was about a third of all KK capital (Hamao at al, “Listing Policy,”p. 
61, with precise data and definitions underlying the graph kindly provided by Tetsuji Okazaki, and Financial 
and Economic Annual of Japan 1902) and most firms were listed and traded elsewhere than Tokyo. Similar 
data for 1915-37 suggests that the TSE’s share of all KK capital remained around a third during World War One, 
peaked at 60% in 1922 and, after a sharp dip in 1923, remained above 50% from 1924 to the war. By 1949-50 – 
an untypical year - the corporate capital listed on all Japan’s stock exchanges (by then all but a few percent 
quoted on Tokyo) again accounted for around one-third of the authorized capital in kaisha (compare the 
figures in the TSE Annual Statistical Report (Shoken tokei nenpo) with those in Bank of Japan, 100-Year 
Statistics, p. 330). 
73
 Compare Hannah, “Global census,” 16-17. 
74
 Hamao et al (“Listing Policy”) note the positive impact of the 1911 change on listings on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. 
75
 Burhop et al, “Law.” 
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Code – develop so differently? Historians noting the widespread development of stock exchanges 
before legal protections for investors were seriously implemented, have speculated that there were 
alternative mechanisms protecting shareholders, such as information signalling and monitoring by 
investment bankers, high dividend distribution disciplining boards, private order regulation by stock 
exchanges of corporate charters (such as anti-director rights or transparent accounts), which 
promoted shareholder confidence.76 As far as we are aware, there is no study of whether interwar 
Japanese corporate charters voluntarily adopted good governance rules. Okazaki et al acknowledge 
that shareholders held ultimate control of corporate activities through the appointment and 
dismissal of directors at shareholder meetings, but argue that one of the reasons for the remarkable 
post-1918 growth of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, far from a strengthening of investor protection, was 
a relaxation of the rules, enabling the exchange to trade securities already traded on the outside 
spot market which had not applied for listing, thus improving market liquidity.77  
                    Another possible candidate for explaining Japan’s remarkable early growth in the quoted 
capital/GDP ratio is the voluntary emergence of gatekeepers and information signallers trusted by 
investors. Signalling by influential Meiji reformers such as Eiichi Shibusawa may have been an 
important supplement to legal regulation in Japan and the zaibatsu may later have been an 
institutional substitute for weak legal investor protections.78 We thus provisionally view the strong 
                                                          
76
 Miwa and Ramseyer (“Corporate Governance” and “Value”) show before 1914 that Japanese quoted 
companies adopted good governance practices: they drained firms of excess cash by paying high dividends, 
tied managerial pay to firm profits, relied on reputational sanctions in the managerial labor market, restricted 
managerial discretion by charter and statute, and actively recruited prominent industrialists to the board. For 
similar cases in the UK see Foreman-Peck and Hannah, “UK Corporate Law.” 
77
 Okazaki, “Corporate Governance;” Hamao et al, “Listing Policy.” 
78
 Franks et al, “Ownership,” citing Okazaki’s finding (“Role”) that zaibatsu enterprises had higher rates of 
return in 1922-36. Okazaki interprets this as the result of family owners being more willing to employ 
professional managers than firms with dispersed shareholdings, a striking reversal of the Chandlerian 
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development of Japanese stock exchanges in the interwar years as a result of intense monitoring of 
professional managers by large investors (in some cases zaibatsu families), rather than wide 
dispersion of holdings driven by strong investor protections. It was post-war Americanization that 
placed stronger investor protections on the statute book, but the occupying authorities also 
dissolved the zaibatsu and expropriated large shareholders. If this caused a loss of valuable signalling 
and/or monitoring, it provides a neatly compatible explanation of the lower post-war penetration of 
Japanese stock exchanges. The later recovery may have been caused as much by alternative 
institutional innovations by main banks and keiretsu as by formal investor protections.79   
.                                                                    AN ASIAN MODEL? 
                                     Was Japanese corporate law - and the flexibility with which Japanese 
businesspersons used it - in some sense part of a different Asian or Asia-Pacific model of corporate 
development80 than its plainly European origins suggest? Not on the dimensions we have so far 
discussed. Japan was precocious in using corporations (and developing stock exchanges) compared 
with most Asians, but was by no means the only case. Singapore and Hong Kong (which adopted 
western corporate laws decades before Japan) consistently81 had (and still have) more corporations 
per capita than Japan and Hong Kong had the highest ratio of quoted capital to GDP in the world as 
early as 1910.82 India also adopted English corporate law decades before Japan adopted the German 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
orthodoxy, but in line with Morikawa and others on the zaibatsu. Fruin’s view (Enterprise, pp. 94-5) that 
Japan’s stock exchanges were “small, underdeveloped in terms of the range and sophistication of financial 
instruments, and highly speculative” is difficult to sustain. 
79
 Franks et al, “Ownership.” Morck and Nakamura (“Frog”) tell a similar story of strong Japanese institutions 
compensating for its weak securities laws. 
80
 As suggested notably in World Bank, East Asian Miracle and Aoki, “Towards.” 
81
 except briefly when Japanese military occupiers closed their Companies Registries in 1942-44. 
82
 Hannah, “Global Census.” 
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model in 1899, yet still at the latter date had fewer corporations (though initially more corporate 
capital) than Japan, even though Japanese corporations until that time required individual 
government authorization or lacked legal clarity. India’s corporate numbers per capita grew steadily 
but slowly under British rule and, after independence in 1947, actually declined for several decades. 
Despite China’s adoption in 1904 of a commercial code very similar to Japan’s,83 China had fewer 
corporations even than India and, after Mao’s triumph in 1949, corporations were more 
comprehensively suppressed than under India’s disastrous “license Raj.” Korea and Taiwan were well 
behind India in the early decades of the century but when the Japanese authorities extended free 
incorporation (on their own 1899 model) to their colonies (in 1920 and 1923 respectively) there was 
catch-up.84 On their unexpected independence in 1945, they followed the Singapore and Hong Kong 
rather than Indian trajectory, continuing to develop the relatively liberal corporate regime inherited 
from their colonial masters. 
                                 The main differentiator of the future tigers of Asia-Pacific from other 
underdeveloped regions in the early twentieth century was the exceptionally small size of their 
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corporations, compared with the underdeveloped economies of eastern Europe, Latin America or 
Africa.85  The average size of Japanese KKs in 1910 was only ¥247,612 ($125,819), in Korea $152,431, 
and their equivalents in the Netherlands East Indies (modern Indonesia) $128,260 and in the Straits 
Settlements (modern Singapore and parts of Malaysia) $138,678.  If such countries had any 
advantage over other underdeveloped economies (where average corporate sizes of $1m+ were not 
uncommon), it seems to be the absence of crony capitalism. This limited incorporations and access 
to finance to favored groups in Latin America and elsewhere and depended more on states “picking 
winners.”86 A multiplicity of small corporations perhaps encouraged Schumpeterian creative 
destruction – multiple foundations and multiple bankruptcies – and a more successful, risk-taking 
growth model than crony capitalism. However, the largest Asian populations suffered similarly to 
unsuccessful non-Asian models: the average size of Chinese corporations in 1910 was as high as 
$1,314,851 and in India $410,339. That structure left less room for creative destruction there. 
                                        Similar relativities are observable for companies quoted on stock exchanges. 
The average size of 389 Japanese companies quoted on Tokyo, Osaka and some other exchanges in 
1913 was, in dollar terms,87 only $3.2m, compared with $34.9m for the 298 listed on the NYSE about 
the same time, $4.8m for the 910 listed on the Berlin Bourse and $14.1m for the 1,198 listed on the 
LSE. Japanese quoted KKs were also smaller than the $16.4m for the 117 listed Argentine companies, 
$9.6m for the 75 listed Egyptian companies, or $7.1m for the 113 listed South African companies.88 
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This was partly because of Japan’s low minimum listing size: paid-up capital of only ¥75,000 
($37,500) had been required since 1894 and, even when this was raised for new listings for forward 
trades, many small companies continued to be traded on the spot market. Also, after railway 
nationalization in 1905, Japan (like Germany and South Africa) lacked this large, formerly quoted, 
sector, which still dominated many other stock exchanges.  
                                   The average corporate size in Japan will, to some extent, be understated because 
neither the overall KK statistics nor the stock exchange statistics group corporate subsidiaries into 
zaibatsu holding company groups, the major ones until the war typically controlled by (unquoted) 
family partnerships, not KKs.89 Seven major zaibatsu accounted for 17.5% of the paid-up capital of all 
KKs in 1928,90 nine zaibatsu controlled several hundred KKs with 15.1% of paid-up capital in 1937,91 
and their dominance was then accentuated under wartime controls.92 Yet some 98% of KKs with 85% 
of KK capital were not in major zaibatsu in 1937 and these included most of Japan’s fifty largest 
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enterprises, many listed on stock exchanges, with shares more widely dispersed than closely-held 
zaibatsu subsidiaries.   
                 Moreover, Japan was not unique on these dimensions. All countries’ corporate size 
distributions are highly skewed (with several giants and numerous small companies) and many 
enumerated in other countries were also subsidiaries of interlocking enterprise groups and 
corporate pyramids.93 Gardiner Means, mainly now celebrated for his work with Adolph Berle on the 
decline of American insider ownership, actually concluded that four interlocking business groups 
dominated by the Rockefeller, Du Pont and Mellon families and Morgan financial interests in 1935 
controlled over 23% of US corporate assets.94 They thus dominated the US economy more than the 
leading family zaibatsu in Japan and, in absolute terms, were much larger. There were also smaller 
interlocking groups in both countries. The American New Deal bureaucrats occupying Japan in 1945 
faced few constraints and forcibly dismantled its enterprise groups, while in the US they had to make 
do with anti-holding company laws, taxes on inter-corporate shareholdings and antitrust measures 
against similar pyramided groups. The US groups shared features with, but were not identical to, the 
zaibatsu,95 though the Mellon interests perhaps came closest in terms of degree of diversification 
and nature of interlocking controls. In Germany also similar holding company groups (Konzerne) with 
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subsidiary and associate companies increased the average size of grouped companies above that 
shown in the unadjusted corporation or stock exchange statistics.96 
                           One aspect of Anglo-American commercial law which initially struck many Asians as 
odd (in addition to fully limited liability joint stock corporations) was joint and several liability in 
partnerships, by which all partners - or any one of them - were liable for all partnership debts to the 
full extent of their assets inside and outside the partnership. In much traditional Asian law it seemed 
more equitable when a partnership failed for the active partners to share liability for its debts in 
proportion to their shares in capital or profits, though in China creditors might bargain to adjust the 
normal settlement according to the relative wealth of the partners and in the Japanese civil code 
equal (but not several) liability was accepted where partners had not disclosed their respective 
shares. A conflict with traditional notions of equity may be one reason why the take-up of western-
style partnerships in China’s 1904 Commercial Code was so low. Even in Hong Kong, where Chinese 
entrepreneurs more enthusiastically espoused western laws, the British authorities proved more 
flexible than Manchu legislators on the mainland, adding to the enterprise menu in 1911 a 
partnership form for Hong Kong Chinese that conformed more closely to native preconceptions.97 
Although there was no similar modification of the Japanese Commercial Code, this was arguably 
because the contractual options for liability and governance in goshi kaisha and in Civil Code kumiai 
partnerships already left considerable scope for traditionally-minded Japanese to mold their 
enterprises to a culturally congenial form and, for a time, ignore new-fangled western models that 
the Meiji elite were keen to promote (and that eventually predominated). 
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                                                                                        CONCLUSION 
                          Our international comparisons suggest that civil law countries like Japan or 
Switzerland can – as they develop – incorporate businesses as abundantly as common law countries 
and that the critical element in organizational menus facilitating this is liberal flexibility, not any 
specific legal form like the GmbH. Our thesis is not that corporate laws and their political 
underpinnings have no consequences, but that the existing literature exaggerates both the negative 
effect of civil law legal families and the positive effect of GmbH-type forms in determining national 
levels of corporatization. There is not one (or another alternative) ideal legal pathway: many 
different menus of business forms have facilitated entrepreneurs creatively molding superficially 
incomplete menus to their tastes, especially if they included relatively unconstrained and cheap 
access to some form of liability limitation with entity shielding; reasonable choices among the 
different governance rules appropriate for both SMEs and large quoted companies; and the right 
cultural or regulatory impetus toward sensible choices among them. To that extent, differences in 
corporate laws in mainstream capitalist countries constitute only minor variations on a standard 
story of evolving patterns of organisational development on corporate lines, promoting both larger 
scale and competitive diversity.98 
                         Did high levels of corporatization propel countries to achieve high GDP per head? 
Evidence on the developmental role of companies is less clear than that on the causes of high 
corporatization. Views extend from skeptics like Ronald Coase (once any clear property rights are 
established free market exchange will sort everything out), Joan Robinson (joint-stock companies are 
secondary details: by and large “where enterprise leads, finance follows”) and Robert Lucas 
(professional economists overplay the role of institutions supporting capital accumulation) to the 
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large opposing literature claiming a beneficent causal connection running from the development of 
efficient financial and corporate institutions to modern economic growth.99 At a most basic level, 
there can be no serious doubt that corporate laws are important for the successful development of 
capitalist economies.100 Douglass North and his collaborators emphasise that “open access” political 
and economic orders (especially democratic regimes allowing free incorporation) are conducive to 
sustained economic growth.101 Although some “proofs” of that proposition verge on the tautological, 
they become less so if we look at regimes suppressing corporations: as in Soviet Russia for six 
decades after 1917 or Communist China for three decades after 1949 (three decades did less 
damage than six). Sometimes, even in less overtly communist societies, unfriendly governments can 
suppress corporate numbers growth for decades: as did Germany for two decades before 1945 or 
India’s “licence Raj” for several decades after 1947. Both eventually (and productively) abandoned 
their illiberal experiments as clearly as communist dictatorships.   
                      Showa Japan had its share of authoritarian governments, but they generally remained as 
favorable as Meiji autocracy or Taisho democracy to developmental capitalism.102 Thus Japan never 
suffered declines in corporate numbers over many decades, though the numbers of kaisha (all kinds) 
did decline briefly in 1903-4, 1921-2, 1936-7 and 1944-5 (as well as for several years of the post-
1989 stagnation). One of the requirements of a passage to “modernity” - to which its elites more 
clearly committed Japan than did most developing countries – is a liberal process of incorporation by 
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simple registration. That was what an international meeting of corporate lawyers in Paris in 1889 
advised for all modern societies103 and that was what Japan introduced in its 1899 Commercial Code. 
                          On the other hand the criticality of more specific corporate laws hypothesized by La 
Porta et al and Guinnane et al may be doubted. The case for a basic form of limited liability is clear, 
but the Japanese experience confirms doubts about whether it matters whether countries adopted 
common or civil law systems, relied on English, French or German stems, or formally allowed 
particular statutory forms such as the GmbH. As long as there was some variety of organisational 
choice, easy and cheap registration, reasonable tolerance of private contracting for governance and 
liability rules and/or a generally liberal government approach to private multi-owner organisations, 
capitalists - and particularly SMEs - appear to be able to fashion organisational forms to their needs. 
They tend to avoid unnecessary expense or complication and spend few sleepless nights worrying 
about the arcane issues that animate corporate lawyers. Japanese businessmen were especially slow 
to hire lawyers (fewer in number than in western societies), preferring ad hoc face-to-face re-
negotiation (based on common sense and continuing mutual interests) to courtroom tussles, when 
business circumstances required contractual or governance modifications. 
                   The importance of contractual flexibility and liberal political stances over notionally 
“perfect” law-making can be seen in Russia today: its exemplary formal corporate laws (adopted in 
the 1990s) were no proof against crony capitalism and corruption.104 Equally eloquent is the fate of 
those menu innovations introduced by well-meaning legal reformers, convinced of their logical 
superiority, but underestimating the ingenuity of businesses already using viable work-arounds. The 
drafters of the new Japanese Commercial Code introduced the German KGaA (limited partnership 
with shares) in 1899 (while not considering the GmbH necessary), but Japanese entrepreneurs 
hardly used it, preferring to achieve similar objects within the KK framework. Bankers who wanted 
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directors of corporations to accept liability for loans simply required them to guarantee the loans, 
rather than adopting the KGaA form.  
                     The overwhelming majority of Japan’s (and indeed the world’s) businesses in the early 
twentieth century - with self-employment  the norm in economies dominated numerically by 
farmers, craftsmen and shopkeepers - were not kaisha of any kind, but sole proprietors. Some 
individuals operated collectively through family arrangements, unregistered kumiai partnerships or 
other informal multi-owner forms, perhaps governed by trust, convention and interest as much as 
formal law. In 1920 the first detailed Japanese employment census showed employers (including the 
self-employed) still numbered 8,958,000, as much as one-third of the civilian labor force. The 29,917 
kaisha of all kinds105 thus constituted less than 0.3% of all Japanese enterprises, and the unknown 
(but more numerous) total for all kumiai is unlikely to have increased the multi-owned proportion to 
more than a percentage point or two. On the other hand, in a developed economy like Germany 
multi-owner or incorporated enterprises already constituted above 9% of private sector 
businesses;106 and in richer societies like the US, UK or Australia the proportion was even higher.107 
In the UK – then the most industrialised economy – corporations alone already accounted for most 
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business employment and for three-quarters of all profits on capital.108 Japan’s twentieth century 
history is essentially the history of the growth of kaisha to become a similarly dominant enterprise 
form. The rise of the Tokyo Stock Exchange to rival western equivalents in absolute size is a similarly 
normal trajectory for a successful industrializer, though for most of the century on this dimension 
Japan was ahead of many civil law countries including Germany. 
                                  In both the industrialized and developing worlds, private (unquoted) companies 
now constitute around two-thirds of the corporate sector by value or output and include many 
SMEs.109 This sector is arguably critical for promoting the competitive diversity on which innovation 
and productivity improvements thrive. Here too, the main contours of Japanese corporate 
development are a slight variant on a common story in advanced economies of flexible 
organizational menus. It did not matter that the framers of Japan’s Commercial Code omitted the 
yugen kaisha until 1940; Japanese SMEs simply modified their use of what was available - KKs, goshi 
kaisha and kumiai - to achieve much the same effect. Societies that allowed human capital, 
infrastructure and basic property rights (modified by some form of limited liability) to work 
creatively toward wealth creation could relax about the finer details of their legal menus for 
organizational and financial contracting. The Japanese were very ordinary capitalists, doing ordinary 
capitalist things, like many others in Europe, Asia, and America who lacked the GmbH. 
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